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SHOCK AND AWE? COVID-19, VACCINES AND THE RECOVERY
I have therefore determined, not only to inoculate all the Troops now here, that have not had it, but shall order Doctor
Shippen to inoculate the Recruits as fast as they come into Philadelphia.
– Gen. George Washington, Feb. 5, 1777

U

pon taking command of the Continental Army in 1775, Gen. George Washington faced two foes: the British and smallpox. As the Continental Army
laid siege to British-held Boston, smallpox ravaged its troops and evidence mounted that the British, who were largely immune due to the endemic nature
of the disease in England, were working to infect soldiers and civilians alike. Washington ordered infected soldiers and civilians be held in quarantine,
but as the battlefield broadened, smallpox continued to spread. At the Battle of Quebec in December 1775, the Continental Army was so weakened

by smallpox that it had to retreat from the field of battle. By February 1777, Washington had seen enough. He wrote to John Hancock, president of the Second
Continental Congress, that he was ordering the inoculation of troops under his command.1 The need was palpable. John Adams estimated in 1777 that for every
soldier killed in battle, disease killed 10.
Washington ordered vaccination preparations to begin in secret because the
political and social climate was not conducive to a public campaign. In 1776,
at the height of the smallpox epidemic, the Continental Congress had passed
an ordinance prohibiting Continental Army surgeons from inoculating soldiers.
A number of states and localities had also passed laws prohibiting vaccination
of soldiers and civilians. As the Washington-ordered inoculations continued in
1777 and into 1778 (almost always in secret, as soldiers required a month of
convalescence), smallpox mortality rates in the Continental Army dropped from
between 10% and 60% to less than 2%. Dr. Benjamin Rush, surgeon general
to the Continental Army and a signer of the Declaration of Independence,
observed in 1781: “The small-pox which once proved equally fatal to
thousands, has been checked in its career, and in a great degree subdued by
the practice of inoculation.”1
Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, a 19th-century French critic, journalist and
novelist, noted, “The more things change, the more they are the same.”
1 S
 mallpox inoculation at the time required a surgeon to lance a smallpox pustule and then insert the infected
blade underneath the skin of an uninfected person. This crude form of inoculation typically resulted in a milder
form of smallpox; however, some inoculated individuals contracted a more severe form of the disease and
died as a result of the inoculation. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5463674/.
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COVID-19 vaccinations dramatically reduced infections, hospitalizations
and deaths in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States in the first six
months of 2021. Yet, vaccine hesitancy and resistance continue to challenge
public health efforts and the economic recovery. Disinformation, amplified by
social media and certain cable news networks, not only undermines efforts
to improve public health, but also threatens the core tenets of the American
experiment in democracy. Even with these challenges, however, Hampton
Roads is poised to grow faster in 2021 than at any time in the previous
decade, and conditions are favorable for continued growth in 2022.
Over the last 18 months, our region experienced a historical
economic shock that, at its peak, left 1 in 10 workers
unemployed, 4 in 10 small businesses reducing hours and
many schools shifting to virtual instruction. These challenges
sparked difficult conversations about why Hampton Roads
failed to keep pace with the Commonwealth and the nation
over the previous decade. Would a recovery find Hampton
Roads again in envy of its peers?

Now, with an economic recovery before us, will we move
beyond meetings to boost economic growth, or will we return
to the behaviors of the past? As the pandemic has so aptly
shown us, we will rise or fall together.
In this chapter, we examine Hampton Roads’ recovery from the COVID-19
pandemic and the prospects for continued growth in 2022. We highlight the
rebound in labor markets, the benefits of increasing vaccination rates in the
region and the emergence of the COVID-19 delta variant, which has led to
rising infections, primarily among the unvaccinated. We explore the impacts
of COVID-19 on the region’s residents and discuss whether the plans for
recovery are sufficient. Lastly, we consider how changes in the national security
environment may pose the next challenge for growth in Hampton Roads.

The Pandemic, Variants
And Vaccines
In October 2020, Hampton Roads and Virginia appeared to have weathered
the summer surge in COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations and deaths. Within
two months, however, the region, Commonwealth and nation would enter a
dark winter, with deaths surging nationally to an average of 3,000 a day. In
Hampton Roads, the seven-day rolling average of residents testing positive for
COVID-19 peaked at 1,437 on Jan. 20, 2021, more than three times that of
the previous peak observed in July 2020 (Graph 1).
Yet, even as infections surged in the fall of 2020, clinical trials of the Pfizer/
BioNTech and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines provided hope. With emergency
use authorization from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, vaccinations
started in late December 2020, although demand far outstripped initial supply.
An aggressive pivot toward greater production and distribution of these
vaccines (and eventually the Johnson & Johnson vaccine) in early 2021 marked
an inflection point in the course of the pandemic. By late spring, Americans
12 and older could go to pharmacies, doctors’ offices, vaccination clinics and
even public schools to receive a free COVID-19 shot without significant delay.
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In late summer, booster shots were available for the immunocompromised and
would soon be available for those 12 and older.
In Hampton Roads, the seven-day rolling average of positive COVID-19 tests
fell from 1,437 on Jan. 20, 2021, to 65 on June 1, 2021, a decline of 95%.
By the end of June, the seven-day average had fallen further to 36. However,
the good news would not last as the COVID-19 delta variant gained traction
in the region, Commonwealth and nation. By the end of July, the seven-day
rolling average of cases in Hampton Roads had risen to 226.
A continuing (and unfortunate) theme of the COVID-19 pandemic is that
Black residents of Hampton Roads have borne a disproportionate burden of
the public health crisis. While Black residents comprised 30% of the region’s
population in 2019, they accounted for 33.8% of positive COVID-19 tests,
50.9% of hospitalizations and 44.6% of COVID-19 deaths (Graph 2). White
residents, who made up 55% of the Hampton Roads population in 2019,
accounted for approximately 40.8%, 37.6% and 48.4% of the region’s positive
tests, hospitalizations and deaths, respectively, from COVID-19.
Why have we observed a high toll among Black residents in the region
and Commonwealth? First, Black workers are more likely to be employed in
occupations that are at higher risk of exposure. Second, as we note below,
Black vaccination rates through the first eight months of 2021 lagged those of
other races in the region and Virginia. Third, inequities in access and provision
of health care can also negatively influence the course of the disease in Black
residents.2
There was, however, a significant difference from the previous wave that
peaked in January 2021: the availability of safe and effective vaccines.
While COVID-19 vaccines are fiercely debated on social media and have
become conflated in the minds of some with political identity, data provide a
stark picture of the impact of the virus on the vaccinated and unvaccinated
populations.
Data from the Virginia Department of Health illustrate these
stark differences. Between Jan. 17 and Aug. 13, 2021,
2 S
 ee our discussion of vaccinations and employment by race in this chapter. For a national perspective, see
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-race-ethnicity.
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fully vaccinated individuals accounted for 0.09%, 0.005%
and 0.001% of reported cases, hospitalizations and deaths
in the Commonwealth. In July, the rates of infection and
hospitalization from COVID-19 in Virginia were 35 times lower
among the fully vaccinated. Rates of hospitalization were 20
times lower among the fully vaccinated when compared to the
not fully vaccinated.
While vaccinations can reduce future inequities from COVID-19, there have
been troubling lags in vaccination rates across Hampton Roads. Graph 3
displays the percentage of the population in Virginia and selected Hampton
Roads cities and counties who were fully vaccinated as of March 1, June 1 and
Aug. 1, 2021. Of the 16 cities and counties in the Virginia portion of Hampton
Roads, four (Mathews County, Poquoson, James City County and York County)
had vaccination rates that were higher than the Commonwealth average.
Graph 4 illustrates the share of the population by race in Hampton Roads
and Virginia that were fully vaccinated by Aug. 6, 2021. Asian residents
were more likely to be vaccinated than their counterparts in the region but
lagged the Commonwealth average. White residents of Hampton Roads were
almost as likely to be fully vaccinated as the average for whites across the
Commonwealth, while Black residents of the region were approximately 5
percentage points behind the state’s average. Hispanic residents of the region
were far less likely to be fully vaccinated relative to the share of the Hispanic
population in Virginia.
In the early phases of the vaccination campaign, a likely explanation for the
disparity in vaccination rates had to do with differences in median household
income as well as personal and professional networks. However, given that the
COVID-19 vaccines are free, the lower rates of vaccinations in Hampton Roads
are a matter of concern. If vaccination rates continue to lag among residents,
they remain vulnerable to the scourge of COVID-19.
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Given the proven benefits of the vaccines to individual and
public health, working to educate residents and reduce vaccine
hesitancy and resistance is key to sustaining a regional
recovery. Unvaccinated people represent an opportunity for
the virus to mutate and undermine vaccine efficacy, especially
with the rise of more infectious variants of the virus. Those
who remain unvaccinated by choice also present a challenge
to employers, since they pose an undue risk to co-workers and
customers who cannot be vaccinated. One need only recall
the impact of COVID-19 on our tourism industry to understand
how a sustained outbreak among the unvaccinated could
undermine the prospects for a sustained recovery in Hampton
Roads.
The good news is that as the number of vaccinations has
increased, public opinion polls have seen robust declines
in vaccine hesitancy. However, there is a fraction of the
population that has hardened its hostility. Disinformation
persists through social media and certain cable news
networks, which have served as platforms for anti-vaccination
rhetoric. Breaching these walls of mistrust requires concerted
and sustained effort from trusted agents in the community.
Unfortunately, we have ample evidence of Jonathan Swift’s
observation: “Falsehood flies, and truth comes limping
after it.”

ECONOMY CHAPTER GRAPHS
GRAPH 1
GRAPH 1
Seven-Day Rolling Average of Positive Tests for COVID-19: Hampton Roads
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Percentage of Population Fully Vaccinated: Virginia and Selected Cities in Hampton Roads,
GRAPH 3

March 1, 2021, June 1, 2021, and Aug. 1, 2021

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION FULLY VACCINATED: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED CITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS,
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GRAPH 4
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Share of Population Fully Vaccinated by Race:
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A Weak Recovery? Labor
Force And Employment In
Hampton Roads
The labor market in Hampton Roads is typically seasonal; that is, the number
of people in the labor force looking for work or actively employed peaks in
the summer and reaches its lowest point in the winter. In 2019, however, labor
markets appeared to be gaining steam by the fall and into the winter of 2020.
As illustrated in Graph 5, the civilian labor force and individual employment in
Hampton Roads peaked at 874,900 and 852,600 individuals, respectively, in
February 2020.

The decline in the unemployment rate in Hampton Roads in 2021 is the result
of two factors: an increase in individual employment (good) and a decline
in the civilian labor force (bad). From January to June 2021, unemployment
has fallen by 10,417 individuals but only 4,448 individuals were gainfully
employed. The remaining 5,969 left the labor force. A declining labor force is
not a sign of a robust regional economic recovery.
If the 50,057 workers who left the labor force since February
2020 had remained in it as unemployed individuals, the
region’s unemployment rate in June 2021 would have been
10.9%, 2.2 times higher than the reported unemployment rate.

This positive upswing was soon dashed, however, by the
emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing
measures and a rapid decline in domestic and international
tourism. By May 2020, the civilian labor force was 5%
smaller than in February 2020, while individual employment
had declined by approximately 12.2%. The labor force and
employment rebounded to some extent during the summer of
2020, but the recovery plateaued in the fall. At the beginning
of 2021, the civilian labor force and individual employment in
Hampton Roads were 5% and 8.5% lower, respectively, than in
February 2020. Even though economic expectations improved
in the spring of 2021, the civilian labor force continued to
contract – a troubling development.
The headline unemployment rate is equal to the ratio of the number of
unemployed people in the labor force to the overall labor force. The number
of unemployed in Hampton Roads declined from a high of 109,046 in April
2020 to 40,191 in June 2021. Over the same period, the civilian labor force
declined from 853,762 to 824,884. After peaking at 12.8% in April 2020,
the unemployment rate in Hampton Roads steadily declined, falling to 4.9% in
June 2021 (Graph 6).
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Headline Unemployment Rate (U3):
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Did Expanded
Unemployment Cause
A Labor Shortage?
Employers in some sectors of the region reported difficulties in finding workers
to fill available positions in the spring and summer of 2020. The leisure and
hospitality sector appeared to be the most challenged by this development.
Nationally, as well as in Virginia, online job postings surged past prepandemic
levels. As more people in the labor force were employed, employers faced
increasing difficulties to fill open positions. The question was: Where were all
the workers?
A confluence of factors likely explains the apparent shortage of workers
in lower-wage sectors. First, some workers left the labor force entirely. The
absence of these individuals meant that employers were competing for a
smaller pool of labor. Second, national evidence suggests that a greater
proportion of women left the labor force or transitioned to part-time
employment. Remote and hybrid schooling, coupled with constraints on the
availability of child care, limited the ability of some to work full time, if at
all. Third, some workers were (and remain) concerned about contracting the
coronavirus.
Finally, expanded unemployment benefits may have influenced some workers
on the margin. Recent findings from the National Bureau of Economic Research
suggest that expanded unemployment benefits played a role in reducing job
applications; a 10% increase in benefits contributed to a 3.6% decline in
applications. For some workers, expanded benefits disincentivized work. Why?
During the first eight months of 2021, full unemployment benefits in Virginia
amounted to $678 a week ($378 regular plus $300 expanded) or $16.95 an
hour.
In the summer of 2021, some states opted out of expanded unemployment
benefits entirely, eliminating any financial incentive to remain on
unemployment. Other states, including Virginia, reimposed job search
stipulations, requiring individuals receiving unemployment to apply for two
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or more jobs a week. As one might have expected, states that discontinued
expanded unemployment saw declines in unemployment insurance claims.
Yet, anecdotal complaints from employers in these states continued regarding
difficulties in attracting and retaining employees in low-wage positions.
Perhaps the only certainty is that this question will generate a large body of
academic research in the coming decade.
As the unemployment rolls continue to shrink, our focus will need to shift to
bringing back workers who have left the labor force entirely. Fully opening
public schools, increasing child care availability and convincing the reluctant
among us to get vaccinated will be necessary for this to occur. The recovery
may be on the way, but it is not complete.

Unemployment Claims In
Hampton Roads
When discussing unemployment claims, it is important to
make the distinction between initial and continued claims.
Initial claims represent the number of people who have filed
a request for unemployment benefits after separation from
an employer. Continued claims, or what is known as insured
unemployment, reflect those who have already filed their
initial claim, had the claim accepted by the government and
continue to file claims to receive benefits for the current week
of unemployment. In other words, continued claims represent
the number of insured unemployed people, while initial claims
reflect the number of initial requests for unemployment
benefits in a given week.
In the spring of 2020, Congress passed, and President
Trump signed into law, the Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance (PUA) and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment
Compensation (PEUC) programs. The PUA program
provided up to 79 weeks of unemployment benefits for the
self-employed, freelancers and independent contractors who
would not typically qualify for regular state unemployment
benefits. The PEUC program provided an additional 13 weeks
of unemployment benefits for those who exhausted their state
benefits. A number of states ended participation in these
programs in the summer of 2021 and authorization for these
programs lapsed in September 2021. Data for PUA and PEUC
filings were only available at the state and federal levels.
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In 2007, before the full impact of the Great Recession was felt in Hampton
Roads, an average of 2,733 initial unemployment claims were filed monthly
(Graph 7). Even though the recession was officially over in 2009, average
monthly initial unemployment claims continued to rise in the region, reaching
8,257 in 2010. In retrospect, while the Great Recession was significant, its
economic shock paled in comparison to the COVID-19 pandemic. Average
monthly claims were 3.4 times higher in 2020 than in 2010
and 13.2 times higher than in 2019.
In August 2007, 2,872 initial unemployment claims were filed in Hampton
Roads. Three years later, monthly initial unemployment claims peaked at
10,600. In other words, it took 36 months for the level of initial claims to rise
from its prerecessionary low to its recessionary peak. In February 2020, 1,961
monthly initial unemployment claims were filed in Hampton Roads. Two months
later, monthly initial claims rocketed to 76,723, an increase of 3,812% (Graph
8). The adjectives “unprecedented” and “historic” seem inadequate to describe
the magnitude of the shock this had on labor markets in Hampton Roads.
If there is a modicum of good news, it is that initial claims and continued claims
have generally trended downward in 2021. While one can think of initial
claims as representing “turbulence” in the regional economy, continued claims
represent “slack.” An individual receiving continued unemployed benefits
remains in the labor force and, as of the last week of May in Virginia, must
actively search for employment each week.3
Graph 9 illustrates the change in weekly continued claims for unemployment
benefits in Hampton Roads from March 14, 2020, to July 31, 2021. Continued
claims increased from 4,315 for the week ending March 14, 2020, to 88,436
for the week ending May 16, 2020. At the peak, more than 1 in 10 workers
in the region were receiving unemployment benefits. As Hampton Roads
reopened in the summer of 2020, continued claims fell sharply, dropping
to 13,936 at the end of December 2020. While continued claims remained
above the prepandemic level during the first half of 2021, there has been
measured progress in reducing the number of workers in the region receiving
unemployment benefits.
3 In March 2020, Virginia Gov. Ralph Northam temporarily waived the requirement that unemployed
individuals must actively search for work. This requirement came back into force on June 1, 2021. Virginians
receiving unemployment benefits must apply for two or more jobs a week and report the details to the Virginia
Employment Commission.
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Average Monthly Initial Unemployment Claims:
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Monthly Initial Unemployment Claims:
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GRAPH 9
GRAPH 9

Continued Unemployment Claims:

CONTINUED UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS:
HAMPTON ROADS, WEEK ENDING MARCH 14, 2020-JULY 31, 2021
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Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted and do not include PUA and PEUC claims.

Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted and do not include PUA and PEUC claims.
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Will The Lost Jobs
Come Back?
In January 2020, there were a record 804,500 jobs in
Hampton Roads (Graph 10). Prospects for the region were
improving: defense spending was projected to increase,
travel and tourism looked forward to another banner year
and global trade volumes were expected to recover from the
effects of ill-conceived trade conflicts with China and Europe.
Three months later, however, employers had cut 1 in 10 jobs in
the region as the COVID-19 pandemic continued to extract its
economic toll.
Thankfully, the region did not remain at the nadir of job losses for long, but
the climb back to the prepandemic peak has been arduous and is not yet
complete. By October 2020, almost 65,000 of the lost jobs had returned, but
progress has been slow in 2021. From January to June 2021, the region shed
jobs while job growth accelerated at the national level. The erosion in payrolls
finally halted in June 2020, but the region still remains 42,100 jobs below the
peak observed in January 2020.
To understand why, we can gain perspective by diving into the numbers. We
ask: Which sectors have grown since 2019 and which have shrunk? We
compare the number of jobs from each sector in Hampton Roads to the same
month in 2019; otherwise, we might bias our conclusions given the significant
declines in nonfarm payrolls in the first half of 2020.
While there were 33,000 fewer jobs in June 2021 than in June
2019, 84.4% (28,100) of the job losses were concentrated in
three sectors: leisure and hospitality, education and health
services, and local government (Graph 11).

in the second half of 2021 as schools reopen fully and hospitals return to
the normal pattern of elective surgeries. While the delta variant may require
masking in public schools and hospitals, limiting outbreaks is key to a
sustained economic recovery. Local government payrolls may lag other sectors
due to the nature of the public budget cycle. Cities and counties typically hold
budget meetings in winter and spring and start the new budget year on July
1. There is a lag between improving economic conditions, tax revenues and
government hiring.
The open question is whether Hampton Roads will better its record from the
previous economic expansion. From February 2010, which represents the
trough in nonfarm payrolls following the Great Recession, to the end of the
expansion in February 2020, the United States increased nonfarm payrolls
by 17.6% (Graph 12). Over the same period, nonfarm payrolls in Hampton
Roads increased by 9.5%. At the lowest point of the COVID-19 recession,
the U.S. had shed almost all the jobs created over the previous economic
expansion. For Hampton Roads, the experience was more traumatic. The
region not only shed all the jobs gained over the previous decade, but it
bottomed out with 5% fewer jobs than at the worst point following the Great
Recession.
It seems that Hampton Roads is playing the same, sad song.
While job growth accelerated at the national level, the region
(again) fell behind. The Hampton Roads economy may pick
up speed in the coming months as travel and tourism and
defense spending increase, but the question remains: Have
we addressed the causes of our relatively tepid growth in the
previous economic expansion, or have we grown increasingly
reliant and complacent, ignoring the real possibility that the
largess of the federal government could one day come to an
end?

Two of the three sectors, leisure and hospitality and education and health
services, should ameliorate the losses in 2021. As domestic travel increases,
demand for hotels, restaurants, bars and other leisure and hospitality services
will rise. We should observe increased hiring in education and health services
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GRAPH 10
GRAPH 10

Nonfarm Payrolls in Hampton Roads,
NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS) IN HAMPTON ROADS:
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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.
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Change in Nonfarm Payrolls: Hampton Roads,
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GRAPH 12
GRAPH
12
Cumulative Growth
in Nonfarm
Payrolls (Jobs):
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Can Hampton Roads Rely
On Defense Spending?
In an age when investors jump into “meme stocks” like GameStop and AMC or
invest in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Dogecoin, the idiom that one should
not put all their eggs in one basket continues to apply. While we may read
about the lucky investor who can now retire thanks to a fortuitous investment
(gamble) in GameStop, we cannot forget that there are two sides to every
trade. When fortunes turn, those who bet their life savings on an unlikely stock
or cleverly named cryptocurrency can suddenly find themselves adrift.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has fueled the Hampton Roads economy for
decades. As illustrated in Graph 13, from 2000 to 2008, DOD spending in the
region increased by almost 73%. It should be no surprise that economic activity
flourished during this period. When the Budget Control Act of 2011 and
subsequent modifications moderated the growth in defense spending, however,
our economy faltered. In the latter half of the last decade, Congress lifted and
finally eliminated the discretionary spending caps that constrained the DOD
base budget. Concurrently, direct DOD spending in the region increased,
powering economic activity and job growth.
We estimate that direct DOD spending in Hampton Roads
will reach almost $25 billion in 2021. If one includes the
ripple effects of this spending, 4 of every 10 dollars spent in
Hampton Roads can be traced back to the DOD. It should be no
surprise that defense spending is one of the pillars (if not the
central pillar) of the regional economy.
President Joe Biden proposed a base DOD budget of $715 billion for FY
2022, a 1.6% increase from FY 2021 (Graph 14).4 In inflation-adjusted terms,
this represents a real decline in the DOD base budget, and that assumes this
modest nominal increase makes it past opposition from some in the president’s
own party in Congress.

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projects the DOD budget will
grow at (or more likely below) the rate of inflation for the next five years. After
several years of increasing budgets, the base budget is flat in real terms, and
it is likely that future direct spending in Hampton Roads will remain near FY
2022 levels as a result.
Even the relatively modest increases in the DOD budget in the coming years
could well be constrained by the unbridled spending habits of Congress
and the president. The last time the federal government ran a surplus was
FY 2000, and that was quickly undone by tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, as
well as the fiscal impact of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Graph 15). After
the fiscal response to the Great Recession, budget discipline (to some extent)
and economic growth reduced the deficit to $442 billion in FY 2015. By FY
2019, the deficit had reached $984 billion as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 reduced revenue growth, and the discretionary spending caps were
abandoned. The fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic was relatively
swift and large in magnitude and likely staved off an ever-greater economic
shock. However, the deficit rocketed to $3.1 trillion in FY 2020. While the
federal deficit may also approach $3 trillion in FY 2021, the passage of a
large infrastructure bill and proposed increases in nondefense discretionary
spending would certainly yield higher deficits in the future.
While we cannot say for certain when markets will demand
higher rates of return for U.S. treasuries, we do know that the
federal debt exceeded 100% of U.S. gross domestic product in
FY 2020. Even if we exclude holdings of the Federal Reserve,
the federal government owes the public $17 trillion. By middecade, this debt will certainly top $20 trillion. At some point,
the butcher’s bill will come due, and when it does, the federal
government will find itself having to raise taxes and cut
expenditures. The DOD, as the largest discretionary program
in the federal government, is an obvious target in such a
scenario.

4 W
 e note that the DOD now presents the base budget as the combination of what used to be the base budget
and the overseas contingency operations (OCO) budgets.
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GRAPH 13
GRAPH 13

Estimated Direct Department of Defense Spending in Hampton Roads,
ESTIMATED DIRECT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS,
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Last updated on Dec. 19, 2020. Procurement data updated on May 18, 2021.
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GRAPH 14
GRAPH 14

Department of Defense Discretionary Budget Authority,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY,
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GRAPH 15
GRAPH 15

Federal Budget Surplus or Deficit in Millions of Nominal Dollars,
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Cybersecurity And Budgets:
Two Immediate Challenges
Even if the Department of Defense budget remains constant in real terms, there
are strategic challenges that, if left unaddressed, will lead to unacceptable
levels of risk. The ransomware infection of Colonial Pipeline on May 7, 2021,
illustrated the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyberattack. The U.S.
military is increasingly reliant on networked systems to achieve battlefield
superiority – networks that may be vulnerable to intrusion and attack. Even if
the military networks are secure, if hackers were to attack civilian firms that
supply the DOD, could the U.S. military be rendered impotent and find itself
unable to fight protracted battles? Without aggressive investments in offensive
and defensive cyber capabilities, the nation and its armed forces will remain
vulnerable to cyberattack.
A more immediate challenge that hits closer to home is the rising cost of
weapons systems. The Congressional Research Service noted that the estimated
procurement costs of the Ford-class carriers remain an area of concern.
Relative to the procurement costs of the FY 2008 budget, the estimated
procurement costs of nuclear aircraft carriers CVN 78, CVN 79 and CVN
80 have grown 27%, 29.8% and 15.8%, respectively.5 Even if the carriers
represent a significant leap in capabilities, can the U.S. Navy afford to put
these multibillion-dollar assets at risk in the South China Sea or Persian Gulf?
Or will it have to surround these carriers with an increasing number of other
ships and submarines to lower vulnerability?

Cost and schedule overruns impact current and future capabilities. To pay
for modernization efforts, the Marine Corps is planning to eliminate tanks,
nine helicopter squadrons, three infantry battalions and three military police
battalions, among others. The Army has come to a similar realization that it
can either increase end strength or modernize the force, but not both.
In its FY 2022 budget proposal, the Air Force proposed cutting 200 aircraft
from the current fleet to redirect resources to research and development.8

The Battlefield Is Changing:
Can The DOD Respond?
U.S. forces have long enjoyed air superiority on the battlefield. Air superiority
not only allows soldiers to maneuver without fear of reprisal, but it also
provides them the security to build large bases and operate sophisticated
supply chains, as well as the luxury of planning when and where to strike the
enemy. The Gulf War of 1991 illustrated how air superiority and the ability
to maneuver ground forces in secret can create significant tactical advantage.
While Iraqi forces hunkered down in Kuwait anticipating an amphibious
invasion, the coalition forces used airpower to help ground forces “swing
around” Iraqi defense in Kuwait (see photo on page 28).

The Navy is not the only military service with programs that have run over
schedule and budget. For the Air Force, the F-35 program’s lifecycle program
cost is likely to exceed $1.7 trillion.6 Also, the Air Force’s KC-46 tanker is
restricted in the operations it can perform, has cost Boeing $5 billion in
unanticipated fixes and was characterized as a $226 million “lemon” by Rep.
Rob Wittman, R-Virginia, in a June 2021 Armed Services Committee hearing.7

The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) provided the punch to the
campaign against Iraqi forces. During an 82-hour span, the 2nd ACR moved
120 miles and engaged elements of five different Iraqi divisions. At the
Battle of 73 Easting on Feb. 26, 1991, the 2nd ACR fought alongside the 1st
Infantry Division’s (1st ID) two leading brigades against elements of the Iraqi
12th Armored Division and the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican
Guard. Even though the U.S. forces were outnumbered, the 2nd ACR and 1st
ID destroyed 160 tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 artillery pieces and more
than 80 wheeled vehicles, effectively wiping out several Iraqi brigades.

5 Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and
Issues for Congress,” June 7, 2021.
6 https://www.stripes.com/news/us/pentagon-reportedly-estimates-that-the-f-35-budget-plan-is-running-10billion-short-through-2025-1.644700.
7 https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/06/17/more-cost-overruns-are-coming-down-the-line-for-boeingas-the-kc-46-program-logs-another-two-technical-deficiencies/.

8 https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/the-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-is-charging-into-the-future-butsome-arent-ready-for-change/ar-AAMpBsS.
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air defense systems and military personnel. The widespread use of drones
allowed Azerbaijan to attack Armenia’s command and control and supply
elements, which were positioned behind the front lines. Armenian forces found
themselves unable to resupply, limited in maneuver and exposed to attacks on
a constant basis. Azerbaijani forces secured a decisive victory, in part due to
the widespread use of unmanned aircraft.
The list of countries and nonstate actors using drones continues to grow,
increasing the threat to U.S. forces around the globe. The Iranian Revolutionary
Guard aptly demonstrated this potential threat when it claimed it had
overflown the USS Nimitz with an unmanned aircraft as it passed through the
Strait of Hormuz in 2020 (see photo on page 29).9 It’s not much of a leap to
envision a future where the battlefield is dominated by unmanned aircraft and
vehicles, and large manned platforms represent targets of opportunity.

M-1A1 ABRAMS FROM THE 3RD ARMORED DIVISION: OPERATION DESERT STORM, 1991.
U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES

The Battle of 73 Easting may well have been the last time that U.S. forces fight
a major tank-on-tank battle. The Gulf War demonstrated the foolishness of
engaging the U.S. military in force-on-force combat. While the U.S. continued
to wield advanced weaponry on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan into
this century, the enemy had learned that direct engagement was an unwise,
if not deadly, decision. During these conflicts, our forces found themselves
engaged in a low-intensity conflict where the enemy often used cheap
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to counter the technological advantages of
the U.S. military.
A seismic shift is now underway on the modern battlefield. In the fall of 2020,
Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in an armed conflict over the territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh. What differentiated this conflict was Azerbaijan’s heavy
use of drones against Armenian forces (see photo below). The Azerbaijanis
procured drones from Israel and Turkey and also converted older manned
aircraft to unmanned aircraft. This drone-centric strategy included the use
of “kamikaze drones,” which dove into targets with an explosive load.
These drone strikes inflicted serious losses among Armenian tanks, artillery,
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AZERBAIJAN DRONE STRIKE ON AN ARMENIAN TANK. AZERBAIJAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, SEPTEMBER
2020. HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=0Y7IUN8UQ-U

9 h
 ttps://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1426268/World-War-3-fears-iran-drone-footage-aircraft-carrierUS-warship-video-vn.

Hampton Roads has long built and maintained large ships and
submarines, platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to the
cybersecurity and drone revolutions on the modern battlefield.
As costs rise, the DOD is faced with the choice of maintaining
current weapons systems or investing in modernization
efforts. Currently, many of our “new” weapons programs are
evolutions of existing platforms: a newer carrier, submarine,
fighter aircraft, bomber or wheeled vehicle.

IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD DRONE PHOTO OF THE USS NIMITZ, JULY 2020. HTTPS://WWW.
THEGUARDIAN.COM/WORLD/2020/SEP/23/IRAN-DRONE-US-AIRCRAFT-CARRIER-REPORT

The U.S. military is facing asymmetries in warfare and cost structure. Tanks
and armored personnel carriers require long supply chains and are vulnerable
to IEDs and drone attacks. The F-35 costs $36,000 an hour to operate and
requires sophisticated supply chains, as well as large air bases. The Navy’s
carriers are increasingly expensive to procure, test and, eventually, operate
at sea. The Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper drone is more capable than the Turkish
Bayraktar TB2 (used by an increasing number of countries) but is also
estimated to be six times more expensive than the Turkish drone.
While history generally does not repeat, when it comes to weapons systems,
the current U.S. warfare strategy echoes that of battleship-centric countries
after World War I. Once considered crucial to naval power, battleships were
soon outdated due to the rise of naval aviation. Innovation diminished the
utility of these large warships; the last one commissioned by the United States
was the USS Missouri in 1944. By 1960, the last battleship ever built, the HMS
Vanguard, was sold for scrap.
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We are at an inflection point in military affairs. Unmanned
combat aircraft will be followed by unmanned ships and
submarines. The Turkish Bayraktar TB2 can loiter above the
battlefield for 27 hours without refueling and at a fraction
of the cost of a manned aircraft. The DOD, at some point,
will have to pivot toward newer weapons systems that are
cheaper, quicker to build and more autonomous. When this
happens, our military services will need fewer soldiers,
sailors, airmen and Marines. Instead of an aircraft carrier with
5,000 sailors, imagine a drone cargo carrier with hundreds
of unmanned (and expendable) aircraft and only hundreds
of sailors. Hampton Roads would not fare well in such a
transition.
Change is coming. It may not be today or tomorrow, but within
years the force structure of the U.S. military will need to adapt
to the advances in technology or have change forced upon it
on a future battlefield. The question for us in Hampton Roads
is whether we will realize early enough that diversification of
the economic base is no longer a luxury but a necessity for the
continued vitality of the region.
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Home Is Where The Heart Is
(If You Can Afford It)
Five years ago, the tale of the Hampton Roads real estate market was spun
around the lasting impact of the Great Recession. Foreclosures continued
to retard growth in single-family home prices, and while sales of previously
owned homes were increasing, there was nostalgia for the “good years” prior
to the recession. The onset of the pandemic brought a measure of worry, but
this was quickly set aside as sales and valuations continued to increase in
2020. Now, with 2021 drawing to a close, the losses of the Great Recession
have been cast aside as the housing market continues to surge to new heights.
Graph 16 illustrates the seasonal nature of the Hampton Roads housing market
and the transitory impact of the COVID-19 economic shock. Sales of existing
single-family homes increased from 2,810 in July 2019 to 3,175 in July 2020,
a jump of 13%. In 2021, sales continued to bound upward, with the number of
homes sold rising by 30.6% from April 2020 to April 2021, 38.2% from May
2020 to May 2021 and 28.9% from June 2020 to June 2021. There were
numerous reports of sellers receiving multiple offers above the asking price and
entering into sales contracts within days of listing their homes.
There are, as economists are fond of saying, two sides of a market. Low
interest rates, coupled with a K-shaped economic shock that left salaried
workers largely unaffected, meant that demand for single-family homes
continued to rise during a global pandemic. On the other hand, the supply
side of the housing market contracted as the inventory of homes for sale fell
precipitously in 2020 and into 2021 (Graph 17). The inventory of existing
homes declined by more than half (53.5%) between June 2019 and June
2021. Falling inventories were largely due to brisk sales relative to new listings
coming on the market. With demand increasing and supply falling, there was
only one direction for median housing prices to go, and that was up.
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As shown in Graph 18, the median sales price climbed from $237,300 (June
2018) to $245,000 (June 2019) to $254,900 (June 2020) to $289,900 (June
2021). We remind the reader that Hampton Roads was just emerging from the
trough of the pandemic shock in May 2020, yet the real estate market barely
seemed to notice the economic turmoil. The first half of 2021 was a seller’s
market, with prices climbing through the spring and into summer.
While the real estate market has been, to borrow a term from ESPN, “en
fuego” for the last three years, we must also avoid recency bias. We need only
return to 2007, when real estate and equities were a “sure thing” and one
could “never lose.” Rising inflation and deficits will likely lead to increasing
interest rates sooner rather than later. As capital becomes more expensive, the
market for homes will cool and the rapid gains of recent times will retreat into
memory. It may be time to be more, rather than less, cautious about how the
real estate market will perform over the coming 24 months.

GRAPH 16
GRAPH 16

Number of Existing Single-Family Homes Sold:
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GRAPH 17
GRAPH 17

Inventory of Existing Single-Family Residential Homes:
INVENTORY OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL HOMES:
HamptonROADS,
Roads,JANUARY
January
2019-June
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Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.

Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
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Median Price of Existing Single-Family Homes Sold:

MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES SOLD:
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Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.

Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
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The Port: Fair Winds
But Troubled Seas
The Port of Virginia’s performance over the last decade illustrates the
importance of effective management even as the Port struggled to retain market
share. A return to profitability and increasing levels of cargo traffic boded
well for the Port prior to the pandemic. The Port was not without challenges,
however, as the Trump administration’s ill-advised trade conflicts undermined
trade with China and Europe. At the start of 2020, even with these challenges,
the Port could look forward to another year of growth.
By May 2020, however, traffic at the Port of Virginia had plummeted, with
loaded 20-foot equivalent container units (TEUs) falling 23% from May 2019
(Graph 19). Yet, the Port proved markedly resilient. By September 2020,
loaded TEU traffic had eclipsed 2019 levels, and approximately 24,000
more TEUs crossed through the Port in December 2020 than December 2019.
Loaded TEU flows through the Port continued to increase in 2021, and it set
a record for total loaded TEUs in May 2021. Empty TEUs (which are, as the
name suggests, empty) also set a record in May 2021, as these containers
were shipped from the Port to other locations.
Import and export loaded TEU flows have increased in 2021 (Graph 20).
Compared to May 2019, loaded TEU export traffic in May 2021 increased
by 13.2%. Loaded TEU import flows, on the other hand, increased by 21.2%
from May 2019 to May 2021. The sustained increases in imports are another
signal of the ongoing economic recovery in the United States, as American
consumers’ demand for imported goods continues to increase.
Graph 21 displays the share of total loaded TEUs for four major East Coast
ports from 2006 to 2021. Two phenomena are readily observable: the rise of
the Port of Savannah and the relative decline of the Port of New York/New
Jersey. As for the Port of Virginia, its market share in 2020 was the same as it
was in 2011; the Port’s market share has varied somewhat year to year, but it
has not managed to grab a larger share of the market over time.
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This is the challenge the Port must address in the coming years, since its
competitors are not standing still.
To its credit, the Port of Virginia has invested in facilities and technology
to handle more cargo. The Commonwealth and the federal government
are putting money into dredging the port channel to accommodate more
traffic. These efforts are indeed laudable. Improving the infrastructure in and
surrounding the Port is crucial to attracting cargo traffic.
Undoubtedly, the Port of Virginia provides fuel for the region’s economic
engine. The challenge now facing the Port is to ward off the rise of competitors
and to gain and sustain market share. What is beyond the Port’s control is
whether economic activity in Virginia and surrounding states will be sufficiently
robust to enable it to achieve this goal.

GRAPH 19
GRAPH 19

Total and Loaded 20-Foot Equivalent Container Units (TEUs):
TOTAL AND LOADED 20-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUS):
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Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.

Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
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GRAPH 20
GRAPH 20

Export and Import Loaded 20-Foot Equivalent Container Units (TEUs):

EXPORT AND IMPORT LOADED 20-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUS):
PORT
OF Virginia,
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Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.

Sources: Virginia Port Authority and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
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Share of Total Loaded TEUs for Selected East Coast Ports,*
SHARE OF TOTAL LOADED TEUS FOR SELECTED EAST COAST PORTS,*
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A Recession For Some, A
Recovery For Others
Much of the economic news in 2021 has been good. Retail sales are up,
employers are hiring, unemployment rolls are declining and trade volumes
are up. Inflation remains a concern, given the trillions of dollars of fiscal and
monetary stimulus pumped into the national economy over the past 18 months.
America may be on the road to recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, but
for some, the economic shock continues to linger.
Graph 22 illustrates that the shock in 2020 was concentrated among hourly
workers. While average employment for salaried workers dipped nationally
by approximately 500,000 from 2019 to 2020, hourly employment declined
by 9 million Americans. Among salaried workers, male employment declined
by about 500,000 (1.5%) while female employment slipped by approximately
100,000 (0.4%). For salaried workers, the pandemic, in general, created a bit
of mild economic turbulence.
National data reveal the economic damage wrought on
hourly workers. One in 10 hourly workers lost employment
in 2020; male employment fell by 4.1 million (10%) and
female employment dropped by 4.9 million (11.8%). While
salaried workers encountered only mild economic turbulence
in 2020, hourly workers found themselves on a plane with
pilots suffering from food poisoning, an engine on fire and all
nearby airports unavailable due to heavy fog. This economic
trauma may help explain why workers quit their jobs at
record rates in early summer 2021.
Who was affected by the economic shock is more than an academic question.
It has implications for both those who will experience income and wealth gains
during the recovery and those who will face continued economic hardship.
Diving into the data, we unearth two observations, one surprising and one
familiar. Our first observation is that while the number of Asian Americans in
the labor force declined by 1.4% from February 2020 to June 2021, Asian
American employment fell by 4.7% (Graph 23). The decline in employment
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among Asian American workers was similar to that for Blacks, whites and
Hispanics, but it was relatively larger when compared to the decline in the
labor force. Two factors appeared to contribute to this ahistorical rise in
unemployment. First, many Asian American workers were more likely to be
employed by businesses engaged in person-to-person services (restaurants,
bars, small stores) that experienced the greatest shock from the pandemic.10
Second, unemployed Asian American workers were more likely to be among
the ranks of the long-term unemployed (27 weeks of unemployment or longer).
A third (and perhaps not entirely surprising) observation is that even though
Black and white workers left the labor force at roughly the same rate, Black
employment fell more than white employment.
Graph 24 provides data on the change in the labor force and employment by
race and gender. The number of white men in the labor force declined by 2.3%
from February 2020 to June 2021. Over the same period, the number of Black
men in the labor force increased by 1.4%. However, employment dropped by
4.8% and 2.9% for white and Black men, respectively. For women, the declines
were more pronounced. The number of Black and white women in the labor
force declined by 3.5% and 2.6%, respectively, over the same period. While
employment of white women declined by 4.8% from February 2020 to June
2021, Black women’s employment dropped by 7.2%.
Even when the pandemic recedes in the rearview mirror, there will be lasting
economic damage. For hourly workers, especially those in the leisure and
hospitality, education and public health, and local government sectors, the last
18 months have not been kind. For some of these employees, scant savings
have been depleted, housing has been lost and remote schooling has left many
minority children further behind their peers. The challenge will be to remember
those who suffered the most even as the good times roll on for many of us.

10 h
 ttps://www.marketwatch.com/story/asian-american-businesses-are-dealing-with-two-viruses-reeling-fromracist-incidents-many-are-hurting-financially-during-covid-19-11613610159.
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Wage and Salaried Workers:
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University.
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GRAPH 23
GRAPH 23

Change in Civilian Labor Force and Employment by Race:
CHANGE IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY RACE:
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2021
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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.
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GRAPH 24
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Change in Civilian Labor Force and Employment by Selected Race and Gender:
CHANGE IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY SELECTED RACE AND GENDER:
United
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2021
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Final Thoughts
Over the past 18 months, Hampton Roads residents have experienced school
closures, widespread job loss, restrictions on social activities and, more
recently, some semblance of a return to normality. The COVID-19 pandemic
and economic shock exposed the impact of disinformation on our social
discourse, politics and public health. Now, as economic activity picks up, we
can look forward to a brighter future if we decide to work together to diversify
the regional economy, combat those who would undermine our efforts to
improve public health and leverage our existing strengths to remind the nation
of our engineering mettle, scientific prowess and efforts to lead in renewable
energy.
A return to the prepandemic status quo is both attractive and
dangerous. Hampton Roads will undoubtedly continue to
play a vital role in the nation’s defense. However, we have
seen over the last decade how dependence on decisions in
Washington, D.C., can sink even the best efforts to promote
regional economic development.
It is time to move beyond quiet discussions of the “D” word:
that is, diversification of the region’s economic base. We can be
an asset to the national defense and work to seek additional
sources of economic vitality. However, we must escape the pull
of inertia and history. Too often, talk of reform has ebbed as
budgetary conditions have improved in Congress. Now, as we
emerge from a historic economic shock, is the time to be bold.
One effort to encourage conversations on diversification has appeared in the
form of the 757 Recovery and Resilience Action Framework, self-described
as “a game plan created by and for the 757’s business community to help
accelerate the region’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.”
We applaud the private and public discussions on how to not only recover
from the pandemic’s economic shock, but also how to foster coordination and
cooperation among the cities and counties in Hampton Roads. If there is one
lesson of the pandemic, it is that we are all in this together.
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A focus on key industries (renewable energy, advanced manufacturing,
cybersecurity, health services) is important. The question is whether this effort
will survive as economic growth accelerates and the immediate need for crisis
response fades. Cynics will note that the dustbin of history in Hampton Roads is
littered with attempts to improve collaboration among its cities and counties.
To paraphrase Ronald Reagan, we will trust the region’s leaders to keep
pushing forward, but will also objectively verify whether their efforts bear fruit
over time.
One recommendation for enhancing our economic outlook is to encourage
the region’s high-quality medical institutions to foster the development of an
“education-medical” center. Hampton Roads is fortunate to be home to Eastern
Virginia Medical School (EVMS) and several institutions of higher education.
EVMS and Old Dominion University bring in approximately $100 million in
federally funded research annually; to put this in context, that’s about 10% of
the federal research funding awarded to Johns Hopkins University each year.
Merely wishing that we could double or triple our federal research funds will
bear no fruit. We must realize that an education-medical complex is only
possible if all the major players agree to set aside their parochial interests and
come together. This effort will be a heavy lift, but in its favor is the fact that
Sentara Healthcare brings financial resources and know-how to the table to
complement the capabilities of EVMS and ODU. We believe that an educationmedical center built around Sentara-EVMS-ODU and other higher education
institutions is not only necessary, but also central to the region’s growth.
We need only look north to Richmond to see how the battle
over the merger of Medical College of Virginia and Richmond
Professional Institute to form Virginia Commonwealth
University (VCU) played out. There was such opposition to
this merger that the General Assembly stipulated the Medical
College of Virginia would retain its name in perpetuity.
Today, VCU is the Richmond area’s only Level 1 trauma center.
Newsweek recently ranked VCU third best among all Virginia
hospitals and in the Top 100 of all U.S. hospitals.

VCU’s efforts in creating an education-medical center are
illustrated in its ability to attract research funding. VCU
reached $310 million in sponsored research funding in FY
2019, of which $90 million came from the National Institutes
of Health. Building an education-medical center in Hampton
Roads will not take place overnight, but, unlike other gambles
to spur growth, it is more likely to lead to higher-paying jobs
and economic expansion in the long term.
Another recommendation (which has been made before but is worth repeating)
is to consolidate public services across the cities and counties of Hampton
Roads. How many library systems, fire departments, and police and sheriff
departments are necessary for a region of 1.7 million people? Each local
system requires an administrative support structure. As Parkinson’s law notes,
“work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion,” and the
numerous, duplicative administrative structures in our region are no exception.
If a trip to the General Assembly is needed to obtain the appropriate legal
authorities, taxpayers would surely be supportive of such an effort to lower
costs and increase efficiency.
None of these proposals is easy. If they were, they would already be
undertaken. They will require time, consensus and concerted effort. In 2020,
the COVID-19 pandemic spurred many discussions and calls for action. Now,
as we approach 2022, we must avoid the sense that we have done enough,
that we have endured, and that is sufficient. Benjamin E. Mays, who is credited
with laying the intellectual foundations of the civil rights movement in this
country, aptly observed: “The tragedy of life is often not in our failure, but
rather in our complacency; not in our doing too much, but rather in our doing
too little; not in our living above our ability, but rather in our living below our
capacities.”
Now is the time for Hampton Roads to strive to do too much, rather than too
little. Yes, there is a chance we may fail, but if we do not resolve to be bold,
our only success will be measured by the degree of our timidity.
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